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Abstract
An appropriate performance measurement sys-
tem is an important requirement for the effective 
management of a supply chain. Because of the exis-
tence of the intermediate measures connecting the 
supply chain members, conventional data envelop-
ment analysis (DEA) cannot be utilized directly to 
measure the performance of supply chain and its 
members. This paper evaluated the performance of 
supply chain under cooperative and non-coopera-
tive games by utilizing relational network DEA. Re-
lational network DEA model considers the interre-
lationship of the members within the supply chain, 
to measure the efficiency of the supply chain and 
those of the members at the same time. The non-
cooperative game is based on the Stackelberg strat-
egy solution concept. In non- cooperative game, it 
is considered that some parts in supply chain have 
more power in marketing competition (leaders) and 
the other parts of the supply chain repetition of sup-
ply chain are the followers. In the leader-follower 
structure (Stackelberg model), the leaders efficien-
cy, first evaluated by using the relational network 
DEA in parallel situation, and then the followers 
efficiency is evaluated, using information related 
to the leader’s efficiency. In cooperative game it is 
assumed that all parts of supply chain cooperate to 
each other   in order to achieve higher efficiency. 
Keywords: Supply chain, Relational network DEA, 
Efficiency, Game theory
Introduction 
During the recent years, severe competition 
among various business companies has made sup-
ply chain management (SCM) a very essential re-
quirement for the companies to maintain their com-
petitive position in the trade. It is then causing the 
SCM to become a favorite subject for studies and 
researches in various academic levels. 
According to reports by Consulting (1999), 
from now on the companies will compete together 
through their supply chains. This report is based 
on studies carried out over 200 manufacturers and 
distributors in the United States and Canada which 
involved various industries such as aerospace, auto-
motive, consumer’s products, and high-tech pro-
ductions and so on. As an example, mobile phone 
industry has been considered. At this case, Nokia 
(the producer) and Symbian (software retailer) have 
formed a supply chain which compete with anoth-
er supply chain of HTC (producer) and Microsoft 
(software retailer) (Xiao & Yang, 2008).
Any disorder or lack of harmony and coordina-
tion among various parts and departments within a 
supply chain, will result in damages and financial 
losses. There comes the importance of continuous 
evaluation of supply chain within an organization, 
and its key role for continuous improvement ,and 
detection and treatment of lose links for final suc-
cess. There are various methods for evaluating the 
performance of supply chain, among which DEA 
has been most utilized in academic studies. DEA is 
a suitable mean  to measure the performance of the 
supply chain ,because it deals with multiple inputs 
and outputs.
Most of the studies about supply chain evalua-
tion with DEA were confined to survey the supply 
chain members individually such as evaluation of 
distributors performance (Ross & Droge, 2002), 
purchasers performance (Hatami-Marbini et al., 
2011), vendor`s performance (Talluri et al., 2006) 
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and etc. They all considered the supply chain as 
a “black box”, whereas the supply chains usually 
involves two or more stages which the output of 
one stage is the input of the next one. So, it can-
not be treated merely as a black box. Also, these 
stages are very much related and interconnected 
together. Consider a supply chain with two stages 
in which manufacturers are at the first stage and 
the retailers are at the second stage. In this sys-
tem, if retailers achieve maximum efficiency in 
conflict with the manufacturers which do not, it 
is reasonable that the manufacturers would try to 
increase their outputs in order to achieve maxi-
mum efficiency. However, a rise in the manufac-
turer’s outputs causes a build-up in the retailer’s 
inputs, because the outputs of the first stage are 
the inputs of second stage. Such issues cannot be 
tackled by the classical DEA models. The prob-
lems and deficiencies associated with classical 
DEA system caused the researchers to have more 
concentration and studies on the internal pro-
cesses and structure of DMUs. Hatami-Marbini 
et al. (2011) classified these researches into four 
groups: standard DEA; efficiency decomposition; 
network DEA; and game theory approach.
Network DEA is classified into three groups by 
Kao and Hwang (2010).Among them, the relational 
network DEA is the most suitable method to mea-
sure the efficiency of the supply chain. In the rela-
tional methodology, a single mathematical program 
is used to calculate the system and process efficien-
cies. Through the constraints of the mathematical 
program, the relationship between the system ef-
ficiency and process efficiencies is obtained. The 
relational approach and methodology was  intro-
ducedfot the first timebyKao and Hwang (2008)in 
order to evaluate  a system which had two sub-pro-
cesses connected in series. (Kao, 2009a) then fur-
ther expended the two stage model by adding more 
sub-processes in series and parallel. They used their 
model as a case study to evaluate the efficiency of 
non-life insurance firms in Taiwan. Kao and Hwang 
(2010) expanded this model for evaluation of all 
types of network structures. They applied the model 
to assess the impact of information technology on 
firm performance in a banking industry. Chen and 
Yan (2011) used the network DEA to evaluate the 
efficiency of a supply chain ,consisting of one sup-
plier and two manufacturers in three approaches of 
centralized, decentralized ,and mixed. All of these 
papersconsidered, that the sub-systems in the sys-
tem have equal power, and no one can enforce her 
strategy to the others. Game theory approach is uti-
lized, when members have unequal power.
Using game theory approach in DEA with 2 
stages originates from the work of Liang et al. (2006). 
They use standard DEA and Stackelberg game (or 
leader-follower) to measure the performance of 
supply chains with two members. In Liang et al. 
(2006), first the efficiency of leader is evaluated, 
and then the efficiency of follower is measured by 
using the information related to efficiency of leader. 
By using similar modeling principle as in (Liang 
et al., 2008; Liang et al., 2006) provide detailed mod-
els for the two-stage process. The resulting models 
suggest, efficiency decomposition, where the overall 
efficiency of the two-stage process is a product of 
the efficiencies of the two sub-processes. Hatami-
Marbini et al. (2011) show that by using the effi-
ciency decomposition of (Kao & Hwang, 2008) and 
(Liang et al., 2006) approach, the model of (Liang 
et al., 2008) will be obtained. All above-mentioned 
papershave applied game theory approach in a sup-
ply chain with two stages,whereas supply chains 
usually involve more than two stages. 
In this paper, contrary to the previous stud-
ies in game theory approach ,a supply chain with 
more than two stages (five suppliers, two manufac-
tures, one distribution) are used, which the outputs 
of one member are inputs of other members. This 
paper evaluated the performance of supply chain 
under cooperative and non-cooperative games. In 
cooperative game, it assumes that all parts of sup-
ply chain cooperate to each other to achieve higher 
efficiency. The relational network DEA of Kao and 
Hwang (2010) is used to find the efficiency of the 
supply chain.
In the non-cooperative game, the concept of a 
leader-follower structure is used. Usually in sup-
ply chains one or more members have unequal 
power and they have their own strategy to achieve 
efficiency, so that one or more members can act as 
Stackelberg leaders. For example in supply chain, 
there may be a set of suppliers who have initiatives 
and can enforce their strategy on the other partici-
pants. In other words such suppliers act as leader 
and the other parts act s as follower. This paper 
finds the efficiency of supply chain when some sets 
of members in supply chain have more power than 
the other participants. For this purpose, first the 
efficiency of leader parts is calculated by using the 
relational network DEA. Then, by using the effi-
ciency of these parts, the efficiency of the whole 
supply chain is obtained.
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Models
In real world the structure of supply chain are 
not same because number of members in chain 
will be different. This paper, utilized a perfect 
supply chain which consists of five suppliers, two 
manufactures and one distribution which is de-
scribed in Fig 1.
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Figure 1. The structure of the supply chain
The second constrain is related to the efficiency 
of stage one, and the third to sixth constrains are 
related to supplier one to four, respectively. The ef-
ficiencies and effectiveness of suppliers 1 to 4 are 
calculated as follows:
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As it can be seen in figure 1, supply chain has four 
parallel stages. In stage one, Processes 1 to 4 use in-
puts X
1
, X
2
, X
3
 and X
4
 to produce Intermediate Prod-
ucts Z
1
, Z
2
, Z
3
 and Z
4
, respectively. In stage two, pro-
cess 5 uses intermediate products Z
1
, Z
2
, Z
3
 and Z
4
, 
produced by Processes 1 to 4, respectively, to produce 
intermediate Products Z
5
 and Z
6
. In stage 3, Process 
6 uses intermediate Products Z
5 
and Process 7 uses 
intermediate Products Z
6, 
produced by Process 5, to 
produce intermediate Product Z
6 
andZ
7, 
respectively. 
Finally, in stage 4, Process 8 uses intermediate Prod-
ucts Z
6 
and Z
7, 
to produced final output Y.
The non-cooperative Stackelberg game
This section considers the relationship of supply 
chain member’s by using the non-cooperative struc-
ture. Specifically, we will regard the interaction be-
tween stages as a Stackelberg game, where one of the 
stages, the leader, has the initiative and can enforce 
her strategy on the other stages, the follower. Each of 
the members in the stages can cooperate to each oth-
er in order to have more power in supply chain. For 
example, we consider that the members of stage one 
cooperate to each other in order to have higher ef-
ficiency. The leader (first stage) makes the first move 
then the follower responds by playing the best move 
with available information. This idea for Stackelberg 
is used in various papers, see, e.g. (Edirisinghe et al., 
2011; Esmaeili et al., 2009;Liang et al., 2006).
Kao (2009b) presented relational DEA for par-
allel systems. By using the Kao (2009b) model, the 
efficiency of the stage one calculated as follows:
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The cooperative game
In this section, cooperative game approach is 
used for determining the efficiency of the supply 
chain. In this case the members of the supply chain 
jointly determine a set of optimal weights of multi-
pliers in order to achieve the highest efficiency in 
the supply chain. The relational network which is 
presented by (Kao & Hwang, 2010) determines the 
efficiency of the system and the members in a single 
mathematical model. In fact it calculates the multi-
player of the system in way to increase the efficiency 
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of the whole system. In other words, the sub-sys-
tems are coordinating to each other to increase the 
efficiency of the entire system. Therefore, it is act-
ing like the cooperative game.By using the relational 
network DEA, the efficiency of supply chain in co-
operative case calculated in model (4).The second 
constrain is related to the efficiency of supply chain 
of given shipping firm, and the third to seventh con-
strains are related to its suppliers. Constrains num-
ber eight and nine are related to producers and the 
tenth constrain is related to disturber.
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Where E
k
1, E
k
2, E
k
3, E
k
4, u
r
*, v
i
* and w
q
* represent 
the optimal multipliers of the mathematical model. 
Now the follower (supply chain) efficiency is comput-
ed subject to the requirement that the efficiency of the 
members of stage one, suppliers 1 to 4, is to stay fixed.
By using the rational network DEA and the optimal 
efficiency of suppliers 1 to 4, the efficiency of supply 
chain calculated in mode l (3): Note that in model (3), 
the efficiency of the suppliers 1, 2, 3 and 4 is equal to 
E
k
1, E
k
2, E
k
3 and E
k
4, respectively. Model (3) is the ef-
ficiency of the supply chain when the members into 
stage one have more power (members in stage one acts 
as leader). In similar manner, the efficiency of the sup-
ply chain when other stages act as leader can obtain.
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The efficiencies and effectiveness of supply 
chain members are calculated as follows:
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Conclusion
The current paper develops relational network 
DEA models for measuring the performance of a 
supply chain and its members in 2 scenarios. In first 
scenario, we consider that some parts in the sup-
ply chain have more power in marketing competi-
tion (the leaders) and the other parts of the supply 
chain are the followers. The non-cooperative model 
is modeled as a leader-follower structure, where in 
our case, the leaders are first calculated by the rela-
tional network DEA model, and then the followers 
are evaluated using the leaders-optimized efficiency. 
In second scenario, the cooperative model tries to 
maximize the joint efficiency of the whole supply 
chain. The relational network DEA is utilized to 
measure the performance of the supply chain.
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